Less than five months after a coup overthrew Niger’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, France, a former colonial power, is withdrawing the last of its troops from the West African nation in order to combat extremist Islamists posing a threat to regional peace.
The military junta forced the resignation of French ambassador Sylvain Itté in September, signaling the end of relations with Paris. The European Union (EU) has also been shunned.
The junta, headed by Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani, has unilaterally terminated the agreements that have allowed EU experts to train Niger’s security services for many years.
Mr. Bazoum considered France to be an important ally in the military. He ordered French troops and other European special forces to redeploy into Niger’s vulnerable western border areas, which are beset by Islamist threats, after they withdrew from Mali in 2022. There, they operated under Nigérien leadership.
But following President Emmanuel Macron’s strong denunciation of the coup on July 26 and his open backing for Mr. Bazoum, who remains in detention at his presidential palace, Niger’s new military authorities chose a drastic shift in course, asking that the French withdraw.
Since then, the most of the 1,500 soldiers have departed, and the final 157 will do so by this Saturday.
The junta has chosen to depend on a fresh defense partnership with Mali and Burkina Faso, two nearby countries. Additionally, they are both ruled by the military and are defying calls for a speedy return to civilian-led democracy, including those made by the Ecowas regional bloc in West Africa.
The US, however, continues to maintain a strong presence in the region and sent a new ambassador to Niamey in August. Meanwhile, France and the EU are shrugged off, with Paris held responsible for issues and crises of nearly every sort and even charged with aiding a 2007 uprising by Tuareg separatists.
Furthermore, the junta has not called for the closure of the two US military installations in Niger, which still house more than 600 US soldiers. These are significant for Washington because Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group are helping the junta in Mali combat Islamists just across the border.
Beyond the republics in the semi-arid Sahel region just south of the Sahara Desert, young urban populations throughout West Africa are undoubtedly deeply resentful of France and Mr. Macron in particular.
He is disliked more than previous French presidents, including Nicolas Sarkozy, who had the audacity to tell a Senegalese audience that Africa had not made enough history. He is seen as arrogant and overconfident.
The emphasis that Mr. Macron placed on West Africa has backfired on him, whether it be in the form of military operations against extremist organizations, the repatriation of stolen cultural assets, or a strikingly increased development budget.
Following a string of coups in its former colonies, France’s influence in West Africa has decreased.
Over the past three years, troops have taken over Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. They have all opportunistically exploited the anti-French sentiment to increase their level of popularity.
The former colonial power serves as a convenient scapegoat for their countries, which are under strain from growing economic isolation and decreased development and security support.
For their ardent backing of Ecowas, Paris and Brussels have also had to bear some consequences.
The bloc’s unwavering stance towards the coup leaders and its attempts to exert pressure on them to take steps towards the restoration of an elected government are based on its 2001 democracy and good governance protocol. Niger is the focus of a trade blockade and the threat of military intervention.
However, Ecowas is a highly unpopular figure, sometimes depicted as a presidents’ club that has ignored election tampering and constitutional machinations in order for leaders of state to prolong their terms in office.
The US has played a more subdued public game in this divisive environment, where Gen. Tchiani and his counterparts from Mali and Burkina Faso, Col. Assimi Goïta and Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, are capitalizing on strong nationalistic hatred.
It took several weeks before it acknowledged that Niger’s elected government had been overthrown, which in turn led to the compulsory suspension of most development funds under US law.
Whereas Paris could not have maintained diplomatic engagement with the military regimes without a humiliating disavowal of its core policies and record, Washington has been able to maintain a generally positive or neutral image in West Africa, where it has no colonial history and no painful conflict legacy from the Cold War.
Leaders of the coup have been prepared to meet with senior US State Department officials and listen to them deliver awkward public statements.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee called on the junta to hold talks with Ecowas last week in the capital of Niger. She did this after the bloc offered an easing of sanctions in exchange for tangible progress toward a return to constitutional rule, and she provided a strong incentive for such actions.
The US withdrew its military assistance to Niger’s security forces following the coup, but according to Ms. Phee, Washington planned to “in phases” recommence cooperation and development support, mirroring the junta’s efforts to restore democracy.
Under military administration, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have all sent troops to the US for training.
In addition to ongoing training initiatives with Nigérien forces, the US maintains drone bases in Niamey and Agadez on the edge of the Sahara, which it views as critical for tracking the movements of Wagner mercenaries in Mali and Libya as well as Islamist organizations operating throughout the region.
The dictatorship of Gen. Tchiani thus feels well-positioned to negotiate. Mahaman Lamine Zeine, the prime minister, struck an authoritative pose on Wednesday, saying, “If the Americans want to stay here with their forces, they should tell us what they want to do.”
If the US does not play nicely, Mr. Zeine was not afraid to imply that Niger has other suitors and friends. Earlier this month, Gen. Yunus-Bek Evkurov, the deputy minister of defense for Russia, made a visit to Niamey.
Furthermore, it is possible that the Sahel may serve as a primary testing ground for the Wagner forces’ reintegration into a conventional framework that will be subject to stricter oversight by the official Russian defense system. Given that Niger has a long history of official military service, the more conventional approach might be appealing to them.
Additionally, Moscow is attempting to extend its “offer” to the Sahelian governments beyond the security domain, despite the fact that it lacks the capacity to match the influence of development donors such as the US, the EU, Germany, or France.
It dispatched a medical team to Burkina Faso last month to assist in managing dengue fever and chikungunya epidemics.
Washington is aware that it operates in a diplomatic environment that is competitive.
While it may have adopted a more tactful public diplomacy than Paris, it will nonetheless face difficult decisions and embarrassing situations when interacting with military governments that do not currently feel the need to appeal to the West or, in certain situations, even the UN.
But the military leaders of Niger are also faced with uncomfortable choices. Although there is some political solace stemming from Russia’s overtures and vows of solidarity from Burkina Faso and Mali, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire.
One of the world’s poorest nations, Niger has a population of about 24.5 million. Mr. Bazoum’s efforts to improve conditions for displaced populations to return home and reassert security control over vulnerable border areas had begun to pay off, as evidenced by the violence monitoring group Acled reporting a consistent decline in violence since 2021.
The likelihood of a food crisis for rural populations was also declining thanks to increased harvests and robust donor support.
However, after the coup, many households’ living conditions have drastically deteriorated, endangering long-term development initiatives. This is due to a combination of Ecowas trade sanctions and the suspension of substantial development aid.
Additionally, there was a noticeable spike in jihadist attacks and intercommunal violence elsewhere in the nation following the redeployment of numerous army units to Niamey in order to protect against a possible military intervention by Ecowas.
For instance, after being compelled to leave their homes by armed groups, about 4,750 peasants fled to the western town of Bankilaré in late October or early November.
Theoretically, Niger’s new partnership with Mali and Burkina Faso might strengthen military collaboration across borders to combat terrorism, criminal activity, and domestic violence.
However, the high-tech intelligence and air support capabilities that the US and France were able to supply are no longer useful to the soldiers.
Paul Melly works as a consulting fellow at Chatham House in London for the Africa Programme.
